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(published July 9, 1991)
A criminal defendant moved to dismiss his indictment for dis-
orderly conduct530 contending that his insulting comments and
accompanying conduct directed at a police officer were constitu-
tionally531 protected speech. 532 The court held that because the
defendant's gestures were nothing more than an accompaniment
to the words spoken and did not rise to the level of violent and
threatening behavior, the language uttered by the defendant re-
mained protected speech. 533
The defendant was charged with disorderly conduct for yelling
abusive profanities while waiving his arms and pointing his fin-
gers toward a police officer on a public street.534 The defendant's
conduct caused pedestrians to stop and take notice.
535
The court noted that if the defendant had been charged solely
529. N.Y. L.J., July 9, 1991, at 23 (Crim. Ct. New York County 1991).
530. Defendant was indicted for disorderly conduct pursuant to section
240.20(1) of the New York Penal Law which provides, in pertinent part: "A
person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: 1. He
engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior ......
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(1) (McKinney 1980).
531. The court did not state whether defendant's action was brought under
the state or federal constitution. The court's decision, however, was based on
People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595
(1989), in which the court of appeals found that the New York State
Constitution provided an independent basis for its holding. Id. at 50 n.1, 549
N.E.2d at 1167 n.1, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 596 n.1.
532. "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no lav shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
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on the basis of the profanities he uttered, rather than on the basis
of a statute regulating behavior, the court would clearly have
found defendant's speech constitutionally protected by following
the holding of People v. Dietze.536 In Dietze, the court of appeals
held that Penal Law section 240.25(2), the harassment statute,
was constitutionally invalid because it prohibited otherwise
protected speech. 537 The court in Dietze stated that "[s]peech is
often 'abusive' -- even vulgar, derisive, and provocative -- and
yet it is still protected under the State and Federal constitutional
guarantees of free expression unless it is much more than
that." 538 To forbid or penalize speech, the court of appeals
requires that the speech rise to the level of presenting "a clear
and present danger of some serious substantive evil .... " 539 In
finding the statute invalid, the court in Dietze reasoned that "[a]t
the least, any proscription of pure speech must be sharply limited
to words which, by their utterance alone, inflict injury or tend
naturally to evoke immediate violence or other breach of the
peace. "540 Because the court in Dietze recognized that Penal Law
section 240.25(2) was held not constitutionally limited in scope,
it determined the statute extended to any "abusive language
intended to annoy." 541 The court voided the statute for
overbreadth because it prohibited a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected expression and its continued existence
posed a significant threat of prosecution for the mere exercise of
536. 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1989).
537. Id. at 53, 549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
538. Id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 52, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (citing Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 522 (1972); People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 401, 91 N.E.2d 316,
320 (1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); People v. Tylkoff, 212 N.Y. 197,
202, 105 N.E. 835, 837 (1914)).
541. Id. The court refused to judicially construct such limitations to render
the statute constitutional. Id. at 52, 549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
The court reasoned that interpreting the statute as limited to specific
proscribable speech would result in an impermissibly vague statute as opposed
to an overly broad one, thereby causing a chilling effect. Id. at 53, 549
N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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free speech. 542
Subsequent case law that has scrutinized subsection three of the
disorderly conduct statute543 extended the holding in Dietze,
finding this statute unconstitutional in that it impinged upon
constitutionally protected expression. 544 In People v. Perkins,545
a defendant was charged with shouting profanities and maling an
obscene gesture directed at a police officer in the presence of a
crowd of onlookers. 546 The court favored the "jurisdictional
approach" utilized by the concurring opinion in Dietze.547 This
approach prescribes that when a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds there is a strong presumption of
constitutionality. 548 The court noted that statutes should be
construed in a manner that saves them from constitutional
imperfections and interpreted in a way that "trims them to their
constitutional limits." 549
In determining whether to extend the holding in Dietze, the
court in Little distinguished Dietze and its progeny by noting that
the subdivision of the disorderly conduct statute, under which the
defendant was charged, regulated behavior as opposed to lan-
guage.550 Hence, on its face, subdivision one of the disorderly
conduct statute does not raise the same constitutional
542. Id.
543. N.Y. PENAL LAWv § 240.20(3) (McKinney 1980); see Little, N.Y.
L.J., July 9, 1991, at 23; People v. Perkins, 147 Misc. 2d 325, 558 N.Y.S.2d
459 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1990).
544. See Little, N.Y. L.J., July 9, 1991, at 23.
545. 147 Misc. 2d 325, 558 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1990), rev'd, 150 Misc. 2d 543, 576 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. New York
County), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 1129, 586 N.E.2d 70, 578 N.Y.S.2d 887
(1991).
546. Id. at 326, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
547. Id. at 327-28, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (citing Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 54,
549 N.E.2d at 1170, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Vachfler, C.J., concurring)).
548. Id.
549. Id. The court in Little utilized the same approach. See Little, N.Y.
L.J., July 9, 1991, at 23.
550. Little, N.Y. L.J., July 9, 1991, at 23. The court stated that "while in
certain circumstances the behavior regulated under subdivision one may be
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concerns. 551 The defendant's constitutional claim undoubtedly
would have failed if the court ended its analysis here. 552
However, the court "trim[ed] the statute to its constitutional
limits"' 553 by applying the holding in Dietze.554 As a result, the
court found the insulting comments made by defendant to be
constitutionally protected. 555
In determining whether the defendant's conduct, i.e., pointing
his fingers and raising his arms, was also constitutionally
protected speech, the court analyzed whether it rose to the level
of tumultuous, violent or threatening behavior.5 56 The court
concluded that the defendant's conduct was not threatening. 557
The court also determined that the defendant's behavior was not
tumultuous and violent by reasoning that this phrase connotes
more than "mere noise or ordinary disturbance," ' 558 but rather,
refers to frightening mob-like behavior.5 59 The court ruled that
"defendant's gestures were nothing more than an accompaniment
to words spoken which, in this context, [did] not remove the
language uttered by defendant from the protection of the holding
of Dietze. " 560
Alternatively, if the defendant behaved more violently, to the
extent that his conduct could be segregated from his utterances, it
appears that his conduct would have been proscribed by the
statute and not constitutionally protected. Unlike Dietze and its
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Id. (citing People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 60, 549 N.E.2d 1166,




557. Id. (stating that "'[w]hile genuine threats or physical harm fall within
the scope of the statute, such an outburst, without more does not"') (quoting
Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 54, 549 N.E.2d at 1170, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 599).
558. Id.; see also People v. Mighty, 142 Misc. 2d 37, 40, 535 N.Y.S.2d
944, 946-47 (City Ct. Rochester 1988) (finding that the defendant's abusive
language and name calling directed at police officers did not constitute violent
and tumultuous conduct).
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progeny, the court in Little did not hold the subsection of the
statute constitutionally invalid, but rather construed the statute as
limited to certain constitutionally proscribed speech, a result the
Dietze court refused to create. 56 1
561. See Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 52-53, 549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d
at 598. The court refused "to incorporate limitations into the statute by judicial
construction." Id. at 52, 549 N.E.2d 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d 598. "While it is
argued that the statute's unconstitutional overbreadth might be cured by
restricting its reach to 'fighting words' or other words . . . such a 'cures'
would, indeed, be fraught with significant problems of its own." Id.
"[C]onstruing the statute as limited to certain constitutionally proscribable
speech would likely result in transforming an otherwise overbroad statute into
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